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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE
BRENN AN,DA VIDA. WILLIAMS,
LOUIE A. SHORT, PATRICIA L.
CASTILLO, BETH L. HURST, and
JAY EZRA REA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No.

vs.

11771

STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Public Safety, Financial Responsibility
Division,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This case involves the legality of the action of the
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah
when he issued an order to the Respondents requiring
1

them, individually, to
a security bond or, in the
alternative, suffer the suspension of their respective
driver's licenses and motor vehicle registrations.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-respondents substantially agree with the
Statement of Facts as made by the defendant-appellant,
but would point out specifically that each of the accident or damage reports submitted was a report required
to
submitted under applicable laws of the State of
Utah. Plaintiffs-respondents object to and specifically
point out that in Point II, Item 6, of the appellant's
Brief (App. Br. 4), the enumeration of the six types
of purported evidence in the records of these cases,
specifically the
of Beth L. Hurst, it is alleged
that there was a letter from the insured motorist to
the Cominission. No such letter was ever submitted
in evidence to the trial court at the hearing on this
matter. When the State first alleged that such a letter
did exist in the file, the attorney for the plaintiffs again
examined the file to find out if any such letter existed
as a part of those files. As of June 19, 1969, twenty-one
( 21 ) days after the hearing of this matter, no such
letter had been made a part of the file of Beth L.
Hurst. There is at the present time no such letter in
the record on appeal before this court. Plaintiffs-respondents attorney would object to any consideration of
said letter the existence of which has never
demon2

strated. Accordingly, plaintiffs-respondents would
maintain that in the consideration of this matter there
'
should be no belief that any such letter is a part of the
facts in the Beth H. Hurst case, or is in any way an
issue before this court. This brief will be written on
that basis.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE STATE OF UTAH ORDERING
THE RESPONDENTS TO EITHER POST
A SECURITY BOND OR SUFFER SUSPENSION OF THEIR DRIVERS LICENSES AND
VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS IS CONTRARY
TO THE LAWS OF UTAH.
Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
pertinent to the issues before this court, states:
"If twenty days after the receipt of a report
of a motor vehicle accident within this state which
has resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage
to the property of any one person in excess of
$100, the commission does not have on file evidence satisfactory to it that the person who
would otherwise be required to file security under
subsection (b) of this section has been released

3

from liability, or has been finally adjudicated
not to be liable, or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments with
respect to all claims for injuries or damages
resulting from the accident, the commission shall
determine the amount of security which shall
he sufficient in its judgment to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages resulting from
such accident as may be recovered against each
operator or owner. The commission shall determine the amount of security deposit upon the
basis of the reports or other evidence submitted
to it but shall not require a deposit of security
for the benefit of any person when evidence has
not been submitted by such person or on his behalf as to the extent of his injuries or the damage
to his property within fifty ( 50) days fallowing
the date of the accident." (Emphasis added)
The specific issue involved in this case primarily involves the impact of the language:
"The commission 1 shall determine the amount
of security deposit upon the basis of the reports
or other evidence submitted to it but shall not
require a deposit of security for the benefit of
any person when evidence has not been submitted
by such person or on his behalf as to the extent
of his injuries or the damage to his property
within fifty ( 50) days fallowing the date of the
accident." (Emphasis added)
1 "Commission" is defined in Section 41-12-l(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as "The
of p_ublic safet:y"_
in this brief shall refer to the financial respons1b1hty d1v1s10n
of the department of public safety.
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In the hearings below, the exhibits offered by the
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah
to support the orders issued in each of these cases, (each
respondent had received an order requiring in the alternative either the posting of a determined security bond
or the suspension of his driver's license and motor vehicle registration) were:
1. The accident report filed by the investigating

officer. (present in every file).

2. The accident report filed by the insured motor-

ist. (present in every file).
3. The accident report filed by the uninsured mo-

torist. (present in every file) .
4. Body shop estimates of the cost of repair of

the damages. (present in some of the files).
5. Personal injury reports filled in by injured driv-

ers and/ or passengers which were prepared and signed
by a physician. (present in some of the files).
As each of these reports was offered into evidence,
the attorneys for the plaintiffs objected that this was
not evidence submitted by the injured party or on his
behalf as is required by Sectoin 41-12-5, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. It was submitted by the attorneys for
the plaintiffs that this offered evidence was of a nature
envisioned by the sta'tutes as being already before the
Commission and the language quoted required some-
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thing other than reports which would be submitted
to the Commission by the normal operation of the
statutory scheme enacted by the Financial Responsibility Laws and Motor Vehicle Code, Traffic Rules
and Regulations.

The accident report filed by the insured motorist and
the accident report filed by the uninsured motorist are
each required to be filed with the Commission by Section 41-6-35 (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Subsection
(b) of that statute further empowers the Commission
to require a more complete description of the accident
of the accident if the original report is not detailed
enough. Not only are these comprehensive accident
reports required of each driver within 5 days of the
accident, but Sec'tion 41-6-36, Utah Code Annotated ,
1953, provides that should any driver be physically
incapable of giving immediate report of accident there
are alternative methods for that driver's report to be
submitted. Section 41-6-35 (b), Utah Code Annotated
1953, gives the Commission the power to require reports
from witnesses. Subsection ( c) of Section 41-6-35, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, requires the report of the investigating offecer to be filed within twenty-four (24)
hours of the accident. In summation, the reports of
the investigating officer and each of the drivers must
be filed with the Commission within five days of the
accident and the Commission may then require additional reports from the drivers and any witnesses to
the accident. These statutes give the Commission com-
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prehensive power to investigate the causes of an accident both to provide a basis for the setting of security
and to permit the examination of the causes of the accident for accident prevention studies.
The body shop damage estimates and personal
injury reports were filed on forms submitted to the
garages and doctors respectively by the Commission.
This was done presumably pursuant to Section 416-35 (b) and Section 41-6-39, Utah Code Annotated
1953, which empowers the agency to obtain reports
from witnesses of accidents and requires garage keepers
to submit reports of damaged vehicles. The Commission is, thereby, given the power and authority to investigate the consequences, that is, the personal injuries
and property damage resulting from the accident.
Section 41-6-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, spells
out in detail the contents of the reports and sets forth
the penalties for failure to answer these reports. That
section, in conjunction with Section 41-6-40, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, clarify the dual nature of the
report program established. First, it is to allow the
Department of Public Safety itself to carry out its
study of accidents so as to enable it to suggest laws
and implement
aimed at accident preven·
tion. The second function, as is clear from Sections
41-6-40 and 41-12-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is,
by means of the required reports, to enable the Commission to carry out its assigned task of determining
the amount of security that must be required of any
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uninsured driver not otherwise exempted from the
requirement of posting security or suffering suspension of his driver's license and motor vehicle registration. In carrying out this function, the respondents
would agree with the contention of the appellant ( app.
Br. pp 3-4) that the administrative agency should
have broad powers in making its decisions. It is clear
that the Legislature intended to give the Commission
broad powers of investigation to effectuate 'their assigned duties.
All of this comprehensive statutory scheme for
supplying information to the Commission had been
established by the Legislature at the time it enacted the
first clause of second sentence of Section 41-12-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953:
"The commission shall determine the amount
of security deposit upon tjie basis of the reports
or other evidence submitted to it ... "
However, the second clause of the sentence then goes
on to..pr-ovide :
" . . . but it shall not require a deposit of security for the benefit of any person when evidence has not been submitted by such person or
on his behalf as to 'the extent of his injuries or
the damage to his property within fifty ( 50)
days following the date of the accident."
This language clearly reflects an intention and an obvious meaning that the evidence required before an
requiring the depositing of security may be issued must
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be something other than the reports required as heretofore described. This additional evidence must be submitted to the Commission before that agency is empowered to issue an order requiring either the posting
of security in the amount that the reports had shown
to be necessary or the suspension of the driver's license
and motor vehicle registration of the uninsured driver.
The key language revealing and expressing the basis
of thi.s requirement of additional evidence are the words:
"for the benefit of any person." The Commission is
not to be empowered to act until someone has acted
for himself because the order requiring the posting of
a security bond or suspension of driver's license and
motor vehicle registration is envisioned as an action
for the benefit of the injured party who was not protected by insurance. This intent and the language
chosen to enact it clearly require that some affirmative
act must be made by an injured party to show that he
desires to invoke the benefits of the act. This fits logically into the whole statu'tory scheme established by the
Financial Responsibility Laws and Motor Vehicle
Code.
This logic of requiring an affirmative action of one
of is to benefit from this statute may be seen by examining other parallel provisions of the Financial Responsibility Laws, Sections 41-12-13, 41-12-14, 41-12-15, 4112-16 and 41-12-17 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which
'
'
govern the situation after an injured party has secured
a judgment against the responsible party. They provide

9

that after the action by the injured party of securing
a judgment, he may take the additional affirmative
action of enforcing his judgment by requiring the
suspension of the driver's license of the judgment
debtor who has not satisfied the judgment in addition
to the usual methods of enforcing such a judgment.
This action creates a right that may be asserted even
over the bankruptcy laws of the United States of
America. K(}.ssler v. Department of Public Safety,
369 U.S. 153, 7 L.Ed2d 641, 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962).
In addition to this parallel statutory scheme, there
is the consideration of the problem of the non-liable
( unresponsible) uninsured motorist who has been involved in an accident. 2 If the Commission has the power
to, or is required to, follow up receipt of the accident re- ,
ports with a subsequent determination of damages and
with an order to the uninsured driver to deposit the security or suffer suspension of driving privileges without
requiring affirmative action by the injured party, great
injustices could be done. A responsible, but insured
motorist is thereby empowered to compound the injury
to, and to add to the pressure upon, the uninsured
motorist 'to force an insufficient 1settlement because
the State is assisting him to do so. In fact, this did
happen in two of the cases brought in the instant matter:
David A. Williams #195,587 and Douglas Z. BjorkI

2 The issue of whether or not the Commission has the power
to decline to issue an order where it determines that an u!l-insured motorist is not liable is not before the Court and will
not be pursued here.
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man # 186,415 (not appealed) . Each of these men were
struck by an uninsured motori.st in such a way that
there was no question, upon examining the facts, that
the insured motorist was the liable party.3 In each of
these cases, the insurance company for the insured
motorist used the order of the Commission to help
attempt to force an unsatisfactory settlement on the
uninsured motorist. In each case, they ref used to give
releases of liability until such time as a final settlement
was made. As a result, but for the action of Judge
Croft in this matter, each of these innocent but uninsured parties would have lost their driver's license
in addition to the burden of the accident. Such an unfair
result could not be intended by the legislature.
Examination of these facts indicates that contrary
to the proposition of the appellant (App. Br. pp. 7-9),
the action of the Commission under the construction of
Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, propounded by the State, would, in fact effectuate injustice. This is accentuated when one contemplates the consequences of requiring the affirmative act of submitting
affirmative evidence before the Commission is empowered to issue an appropriate order. If an insured driver
were to go to the Commission and submit proof of his
injuries when he was the party really responsible for the
accident and its consequences, he would open himself to
additional liability for the economic loss to the uninsured
3 Williams was struck by a driver who ran a red light and
Bjorkman was struck by a driver making an illegal left turn.
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party for that party's loss of his driving privileges in
addition to liability for the personal injury and the
property damages.
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Croft stated
clearly that this statute meant what it said. In pages
6-8 of his Memorandum Decision, he stated:

" ... However_, the statute clearly provides
that even when such determination is made, the
Commission shall not require a deposit of security for the benefit of any person when evidence
has not been submitted by such person or on ,
his behalf as to the extent of his injuries or the
damage to his property within 50 days following
the date of the accident."
"Under Section 41-12-5 (b) the suspension
lies only if the driver or owner fails to deposit
the security required to be filed in the sum so
determined by the Commission. Since, as set
forth in the preceding paragraph, the deposit of
security shall not be required by the Commission
unless evidence has been submitted within the
50 day period by the injured person or on his
behalf, it seems clear to me that the suspension
will not lie until such evidence is submitted within the 50 day period."
"This requires, in my opinion, something more
than the filing by the injured person of the Section 41-6-35 report, for that report must be
filed within five days, and if that was all that
was intended by the legislature to be filed by
the injured party, no further evidence would be
required within the 50 day period. The statutes
relating to this five-day report do not require
the setting forth of information from which the
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Commission is to determine the amount of security to be filed by another driver."
" . . . it seems to me that by the evidencewithin-50-days requirement, the legislature intended that if the injured party intended to hold
the other driver responsible for injuries or damage, such injured party must make some affirmative showing that he so intended by coming forward and filing with the department evidence
as to the extent of his injuries, and that it was
not the legislative intent that, absent such filing
by or on behalf of the injured party, the Commission could or should go head and collect such
evidence on its own initiative. It would do well,
instead, to advise the respective drivers of the
50-day filing requirement."
"Even if an injured party concluded within
60 days after the accident that his own fault
caused the accident, all of the reports and information collected by the Commission would be
on hand from which a determination of damage
might be made. To then say that even though
the injured party did not intend to seek recovery
for his damages, the Commission can nevertheless require security and suspend the license, if
not filed, seems grossly unfair."
"The requirement of security is for the benefit
of the injured driver, not 'the public, and to suspend the license of a driver when the other party
manifests no intent to seek recompense for his
injury by filing evidence serves no useful or
public purpose.
"It is, therefore, my opinion that since, in the
record before me, none of the other parties involved in the accident filed the required evidence
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within the 50 day period, no security was required
to be filed by the plaintiffs. Their licenses were
not subject to revocation, and the orders suspending the same were invalid and contrary to
law."
CONCLUSION

Section 41-12-5 (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
is very clear in its requirement that before the Commission is empowered to issue an order requiring the
posting of a bond or the suspension of drivers license
and vehicle registration of an uninsured driver the
affirmative action of submitting evidence of his damages is required of the driver for whose benefit such
an order will operate. The evidence must be submitted .
within fifty days of the accident and cannot be the ,
reports required by Sections 41-6-35, 36, 37, 39 or 40,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. No such evidence was presented to or was before the Commission when it issued
any of the orders challenged in this action. Those orders
were therefore, invalid, and their injunction by the
District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondents
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